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LIABILITY FOR COCONSPIRATOR'S CRIMES
IN THE WISCONSIN PARTY TO A CRIME
STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Wisconsin party to a crime statute' provides, in part,
that one who conspires to commit a crime may be liable for
a crime committed by a coconspirator. 2 Imposing such lia-
bility is not subject to question where the conspirator is ac-
tively involved in the crime, giving advice, counsel or aid. A
debatable issue arises, however, where the conspirator is not
active in the commission of the specific crime, but merely
agrees with another to commit a crime.
Most jurisdictions agree with Wisconsin in holding that
regardless of whether one actively participates, a conspirator
may justly be held vicariously liable for a coconspirator's
crime.3 Massachusetts long ago rejected this conspiracy the-
1. Wis. STAT. § 939.05 (1979). The statute provides:
(1) Whoever is concerned in the commission of a crime is a principal and
may be charged with and convicted of the commission of the crime although
he did not directly commit it and although the person who directly committed
it has not been convicted or has been convicted of some other degree of the
crime or of some other crime based on the same act.
(2) A person is concerned in the commission of the crime if he:
(a) Directly commits the crime; or
(b) Intentionally aids and abets the commission of it; or
(c) Is a party to a conspiracy with another to commit it or advises, hires,
counsels or otherwise procures another to commit it. Such a party is also con-
cerned in the commission of any other crime which is committed in pursuance
of the intended crime and which under the circumstances is a natural and
probable consequence of the intended crime. This paragraph does not apply
to a person who voluntarily changes his mind and no longer desires that the
crime be committed and notifies the other parties concerned of his withdrawal
within a reasonable time before the commission of the crime so as to allow the
others also to withdraw.
2. Id § 939.05(2)(c) (1979).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 655 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); United States
v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Johnson v. State, 252 Ark. 1113, 482 S.W.2d
600 (1972); People v. Carmichael, 106 Cal. App. 3d 124, 612 P.2d 962, 164 Cal. Rptr.
872 (1980); Norman v. State, 381 So. 2d 1024 (Miss. 1980); State v. Stein, 70 N.J. 369,
360 A.2d 347 (1976); Commonwealth v. Roux, 465 Pa. 482, 350 A.2d 867 (1976); State
v. Barton, - R.I. 424 A.2d 1033 (1981). See also 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conspiracy § 19
(1979); 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 74 (1967).
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ory, holding that active participation is necessary. 4 The de-
bate over the theory has increased with New York5 and
North Carolina6 courts recently following the Massachusetts
rule. This comment will outline the conspiracy theory, dis-
cuss its bases and attempt to evaluate whether it merits its
place in the party to a crime statute.
II. THE CONSPIRAcY THEORY OF ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
Under the conspiracy theory of accomplice liability, 7 the
essential act is an agreement between two or more to direct
their conduct toward realization of a criminal objective."
The criminal agreement may be express or tacit, and may be
proved by circumstantial evidence.9 Each member of the
conspiracy must individually and consciously intend the re-
alization of the criminal objective. 10 Further, a conspirator
4. Commonwealth v. Knapp, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 494 (1830). See also Common-
wealth v. Perry, 357 Mass. 149, 256 N.E.2d 745 (1970); Commonwealth v. Stasiun, 349
Mass. 38, 206 N.E.2d 672 (1965).
5. People v. McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 48, 399 N.E.2d 1177, 424 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1979),
cert. denied sub nom. Quamina v. New York, 446 U.S. 942 (1980).
6. State v. Small, 301 N.C. 407, 272 S.E.2d 128 (1980).
7. The conspiracy theory of accomplice liability stated in Wis. STAT.
§ 939.05(2)(c) (1979) should not be confused with the independent crime of conspir-
acy, which punishes one who agrees to commit a crime without regard to whether a
substantive crime results from that agreement. WIs. STAT. § 939.31 (1979) sets forth
the crime of conspiracy as follows:
Whoever, with intent that a crime be committed, agrees or combines with
another for the purpose of committing that crime may, if one or more of the
parties to the conspiracy does an act to effect its object, be fined or imprisoned
or both not to exceed the maximum provided for the completed crime; except
that for a conspiracy to commit a crime for which the penalty is life imprison-
ment, the actor is guilty of a Class B felony.
Note that in Wisconsin one cannot be convicted both of conspiracy under § 939.31
and as a party to a substantive crime which is the objective of the conspiracy. Wis.
STAT. § 939.72(2) (1979).
8. State v. Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d 527, 556, 129 N.W.2d 155, 167 (1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 918 (1965). See also Bergeron v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 595, 606-07, 271 N.W.2d
386, 389-90 (1978); Hawpetoss v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 71, 80, 187 N.W.2d 823, 827 (1971);
State v. Copening, 103 Wis. 2d 564, 579, 309 N.W.2d 850, 857 (Ct. App. 1981).
9. Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d at 559, 129 N.W.2d at 169. See also Bergeron, 85 Wis. 2d at
611, 271 N.W.2d at 389-90; Hawpetoss, 52 Wis. 2d at 80-81, 187 N.W.2d at 827; Co-
pening, 103 Wis. 2d at 579, 309 N.W.2d at 857.
10. Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d at 556, 129 N.W.2d at 167. See also Bergeron, 85 Wis. 2d
at 606-07, 271 N.W.2d at 389-90; Hawpetoss, 52 Wis. 2d at 80, 187 N.W.2d at 827;
Copening, 103 Wis. 2d at 579, 309 N.W.2d at 857. Additionally, a conspirator must
gain benefit from the criminal agreement, that is, have a stake in the venture. Nutley,
24 Wis. 2d at 556, 129 N.W.2d at 167. See also Bergeron, 85 Wis. 2d at 606, 271
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is liable not only for a crime which he or she intended to
occur, but for any other crime which under the circum-
stances is a natural and probable consequence of the in-
tended crime." In short, "[t]he fact of [the criminal]
agreement imposes liability for the substantive offense on all
conspirators when the crime is consummated by a single
perpetrator."' 2
The Wisconsin conspiracy theory parallels the federal
law. The drafters of the Wisconsin Criminal Code used the
federal law as a model for the party to a crime statute.' 3 The
leading federal case is Pinkerton v. United States.'4 In Pinker-
ton, the defendant was convicted with his brother for con-
spiring to evade federal taxes and for specific evasions
committed by his brother while the defendant was in jail.
The government presented no evidence that the defendant
directly participated in the tax violations. 15 The Supreme
Court decided that direct participation was not necessary
and held that the jury could convict the defendant of the
crimes committed by his brother upon proof that the crimes
were committed in furtherance of the original conspiracy.' 6
In dicta, the Court limited the conspiracy theory to "natural
consequences," stating:
A different case would arise if the substantive offense
committed by one of the conspirators was not in fact done
in furtherance of the conspiracy, did not fall within the
N.W.2d at 389; Krueger v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 272, 286, 267 N.W.2d 602, 609 (1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 874 (1978).
11. Wis. STAT. § 939.05(2)(c) (1979). See infra note 104.
12. Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d at 556, 129 N.W.2d at 167. Note, however, that a conspir-
ator is not responsible for crimes committed by coconspirators after a timely notifica-
tion of withdrawal from the conspiracy. Wis. STAT. § 939.05(2)(c) (1979). Cf. United
States ex rel Chabonian v. Gray, 398 F. Supp. 1020 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (no withdrawal
defense where defendant did not leave burglary scene). The defense of withdrawal
does not appear to be available when the defendant is charged with the crime of
conspiracy. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
13. See Minutes, Criminal Code Advisory Committee of the Wisconsin Legisla-
tive Council, February 22 and March 28, 1952 (copy on file in Criminal Justice Refer-
ence and Information Center, University of Wisconsin Law Building, Madison,
Wisconsin), citedin Brief of Amicus Curiae at 10-11, n.13, Wray v. State, 87 Wis. 2d
367, 275 N.W.2d 731 (Ct. App. 1978), afdper curiam, 91 Wis. 2d 839, 280 N.W.2d
784 (1979).
14. 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
15. Id at 645.
16. Id at 646-47.
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scope of the unlawful project, or was merely a part of the
ramifications of the plan which could not be reasonably
foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the un-
lawful agreement.' 7
Pinkerton was affirmed in Nye & Nissen v. United States,Is
where the Court stated that in Pinkerton it "held that a con-
spirator could be held guilty of the substantive offense even
though he did no more than join the conspiracy, provided
that the substantive offense was committed in furtherance of
the conspiracy and as a part of it."' 9 The Wisconsin conspir-
acy theory also imposes liability for coconspirators based on
the act of conspiracy alone,20 and limits liability to natural
and probable consequences. 21 Thus, the Wisconsin conspir-
acy theory of accomplice liability follows the Pinkerton rule.
The Wisconsin conspiracy theory with its minimal re-
quirement of a criminal agreement contrasts with other ap-
proaches to accomplice liability.22 In his classic formulation,
Judge Learned Hand stated that the definition of an accom-
plice requires that "he in some sort associate himself with
the venture, that he participate in it as something he wishes
to bring about, that he seek by his conduct to make it suc-
ceed."2 3 Judge Hand emphasized not criminal agreement
but active participation in the criminal venture. Such active
17. Id at 647-48.
18. 336 U.S. 613 (1949).
19. Id at 618.
20. Wis. STAT. § 939.05(2)(c) (1979). See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying
text. Wisconsin cases, however, have revealed defendants who not only conspired but
actively participated in commission of the agreed upon crimes. See infra notes 103-04
and accompanying text.
21. Wis. STAT. § 939.05(2)(c) (1979). See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
22. Justice Jackson, commenting on the Pinkerton case, described the conspiracy
theory as "the novel and dubious theory that conspiracy is equivalent in law to aiding
and abetting." Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 451 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
Note, however, that although the conspiracy theory may appear to be in contrast
to the accomplice theories of aiding and abetting and of solicitation, which require
active participation, the conspiracy theory was long ago accepted by most courts. See
Perkins, The Act of One Conspirator, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 337, 338-39 (1974).
23. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401,402 (2d Cir. 1938) (describing the liabil-
ity of one who aids, abets, counsels, commands or procures). This formulation of
accomplice liability was quoted as definitive in Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336
U.S. 613, 618-19 (1949), and has been quoted in recent cases as the standard rule. See,
e.g., United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 448 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Smith,
546 F.2d 1275, 1284 (5th Cir. 1977).
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participants have been convicted of crimes directly executed
by another under the theories of aiding and abetting and of
solicitation.24 Section 939.05 of the Wisconsin statutes sets
forth those two theories, and it will prove useful to compare
them with the conspiracy theory before discussing the merits
of the conspiracy theory.25
For conviction under the aiding and abetting26 theory,
one must consciously intend that his or her conduct will aid
another in the execution of the crime.27 The conduct of an
aider and abettor must, as a matter of objective fact, aid the
other person in execution of the crime.28 Although such con-
duct may include an act constituting an essential element of
the crime, the Wisconsin court has not required such con-
duct in all cases.29 For example, although mere presence at
the scene is not sufficient to prove aiding and abetting, 30 evi-
dence showing the defendant stood ready and willing to
render aid if needed has been held sufficient.3 ' Further, aid-
ing and abetting does not require a defendant's direct pres-
ence at the scene; locating a victim and driving a getaway car
after the crime can constitute aiding and abetting.32 In
24. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOT, CRIMINAL LAW § 64 (1972).
25. The jury need not agree on the applicable theory; jurors may disagree on
whether the defendant directly committed the crime, aided and abetted, solicited, or
conspired in the crime. Holland v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 134,280 N.W.2d 288 (1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 931 (1980). See Note, Application of Gipson's Unanimous Verdict
Rationale to the Wisconsin Party to a Crime Statute, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 597, 613.
26. Wis. STAT. § 939.05(2)(b) (1979).
27. State v. Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d 527, 554-56, 129 N.W.2d 155, 167 (1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 918 (1965). See also Krueger v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 272, 285-86, 267
N.W.2d 602, 608-09 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 874 (1978); Mentek v. State, 71 Wis.
2d 799, 804-06, 238 N.W.2d 752,755-56 (1976); Clark v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 194, 197-98,
214 N.W.2d 450, 452 (1974). Also instructive as to intent are cases which held that the
aider and abettor must have knowledge or belief that the other intends to commit a
crime. Frankovis v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 141, 148-50, 287 N.W.2d 791, 794-95 (1980);
Roehl v. State, 77 Wis. 2d 398, 407-08, 253 N.W.2d 210, 214-15 (1977); State v. Hau-
gen, 52 Wis. 2d 791, 796-97, 191 N.W.2d 12, 15-16 (1971).
28. Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d at 554-56, 129 N.W.2d at 167. See also May v. State, 97
Wis. 2d 175, 184-85, 293 N.W.2d 478, 483 (1980); Hawpetoss v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 71,
77-79, 187 N.W.2d 823, 826 (1971).
29. Taylor v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 168, 177-78, 197 N.W.2d 805, 810 (1972).
30. State v. Haugen, 52 Wis. 2d 791, 796-97, 191 N.W.2d 12, 15-16 (1971).
31. Krueger v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 272, 285-86, 267 N.W.2d 602, 608-09 (1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 874 (1978).
32. State v. Marshall, 92 Wis. 2d 101, 122, 284 N.W.2d 592, 601 (1979).
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Carter v. State33 the Wisconsin court described the aiding
and abetting theory:
Like a drama on the stage, each party was engaged in the
general scheme of the crime by performing his allotted part
in the plot; but unlike a drama, all the actors, those who
played the principal roles and those in the supporting roles,
were guilty under the law as principals.34
Aiding and abetting includes assistance rendered by words
and acts, and covers any encouragement or support given at
or near the scene of the crime.
The solicitation 36 section of 939.05(2)(c) concerns de-
fendants not present at the scene and parallels the common
law concept of an accessory before the fact.37 A solicitor is
33. 27 Wis. 2d 451, 134 N.W.2d 444 (1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 867 (1967).
34. Id at 455, 134 N.W.2d at 446.
35. Judiciary Committee Report on the Criminal Code, 5 Wisconsin Legislative
Council Report 4 (1953). See also United States v. Barnett, 507 F. Supp. 670, 674 n.4
(E.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982) (distinction
between "aiding" and "abetting" another: aiding does not imply guilty knowledge or
felonious intent, whereas abetting includes knowledge of the wrongful purpose and
encouragement of the crime).
It is not necessary that an aider and abettor enter into an agreement, that is, a
conspiracy, with the perpetrator to commit a crime. See State v. Manson, 76 Wis. 2d
482, 486, 251 N.W.2d 788, 790 (1977). InManson the defendant joined others in a bar
fight during which the victim was beaten to death; the court affirmed the defendant's
second degree murder conviction as an aider and abettor, though no conspiracy ex-
isted among the parties. Although the state conceded that no evidence of an agree-
ment existed because of the suddenness of the fight and because the defendant did not
know the other parties, the defendant was an aider and abettor. Id
Further, it is not necessary that the perpetrator be aware of the aider and abettor's
efforts. State v. Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d 527, 555, 129 N.W.2d 155, 167 (1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 918 (1965). In Nutley the court cited the famous Talley case:
[A] group of men in one town set out to kill a particular person who lived in
another town. The friends of the victim, hearing of the plot against him, at-
tempted to warn him by sending him a telegraph message. Another person, a
judge, who also disliked the potential victim, directed the telegraph operator to
destroy the message, telling him it was unimportant. The judge was held liable
for murder under the complicity theory, even though the perpetrators were not
aware of his assistance until after they consummated the crime.
Id (citing State v. Talley, 102 Ala. 25, 15 So. 722 (1894)).
The Wisconsin court has made two other important statements on aiding and
abetting. A "stake in the venture," although relevant to prove aiding and abetting, is
not necessary to prove it. Krueger v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 272, 286, 267 N.W.2d 602, 609
(1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 874 (1978). Finally, the defense of withdrawal is not
available to an aider and abettor. May v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 540, 549-50, 283 N.W.2d
460, 463 (Ct. App. 1979), affid, 97 Wis. 2d 175, 188, 293 N.W.2d 478, 484 (1980).
36. WIs. JURY INSTR.--CRIMINAL 400(C) (1962).
37. See Krueger v. State, 171 Wis. 566, 177 N.W. 917 (1920); Karakutza v. State,
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liable as one who advises, hires, counsels or otherwise pro-
cures another to commit a crime.38 The Wisconsin court has
failed to recognize solicitation as a distinct theory of accom-
plice liability. In State v. Charbarneau39 the court stated that
section 939.05(2)(b) refers to guilt as an aider and abettor,
while section 939.05(2)(c) relates to guilt as a conspirator.4n
The court's omission of solicitation as a third theory embod-
ied in that statute is understandable because solicitation is
subsumed by the conspiracy theory, which broadly covers
those concerned in the commission of the crime prior to its
actual commission.4' However, the court ought to separate
163 Wis. 293, 156 N.W. 965 (1916). See also Brief for Appellant at 11, State v.
Cydzik, 60 Wis. 2d 683, 211 N.W.2d 421 (1973). Most Wisconsin cases involving
solicitors, that is, accessories before the fact, are handled in terms of conspiracy the-
ory. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. North Carolina, because it distin-
guishes between the liability of a solicitor, a conspirator and an aider and abettor, has
many cases employing the solicitation theory. See State v. Furr, 292 N.C. 711, 235
S.E.2d 193 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924 (1977).
38. Wis. STAT. § 939.05(2)(c) (1979). A solicitor is not liable as a party to a crime
where he or she gives timely notification of such withdrawal. Id However, the de-
fense of withdrawal does not appear to be available when the defendant is charged
with the crime of solicitation. See Wis. STAT. § 939.30 (1979).
The solicitation theory of accomplice liability set forth in Wis. STAT.
§ 939.05(2)(c) (1979), should not be confused with the independent crime of solicita-
tion which provides:
Whoever, with intent that a felony be committed, advises another to com-
mit that crime under circumstances which indicate unequivocally that he or
she has such intent is guilty of a Class D felony; except that for a solicitation to
commit a crime for which the penalty is life imprisonment the actor is guilty of
a Class C felony and for a solicitation to commit a Class E felony the actor is
guilty of a Class E felony.
Wis. STAT. § 939.30 (1979). The solicitor can be convicted of the crime of solicitation
even if the person solicited does not commit the object crime. If the person solicited
does commit the crime, the solicitor becomes a party to the crime under Wis. STAT.
§ 939.05(2)(c) (1979). A person may not be convicted under both § 939.30 for solicita-
tion and § 939.05 as a party to the crime which is the objective of the solicitation.
Wis. STAT. § 939.72(1) (1979).
39. 82 Wis. 2d 644, 264 N.W.2d 227 (1978).
40. Id at 651, 264 N.W.2d at 231.
41. Judiciary Committee Report on the Criminal Code, 5 Wisconsin Legislative
Council Report 4 (1953). One commentator rejected the conspiracy theory of accom-
plice liability, distinguishing conspiracy from solicitation:
This "predominantly mental" character of the crime [of conspiracy] distin-
guishes it from accessorial criminality which attaches to the conduct of one
who counsels, commands, induces or procures another to commit a crime. The
difference lies in the gap between promise and incitement, between acquies-
cence and procurement. To incite or procure is an affirmative act closely allied
to aiding and abetting ....
[Vol. 66:344
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solicitation from conspiracy in any theoretical analysis. As
will be discussed below, a solicitor who actively participates
in the criminal venture as one who advises, incites or com-
mands another to commit a crime, may not resemble a con-
spirator who merely agrees to commit a crime and does
nothing more.42
III. ANALYSIS
Most jurisdictions agree with Wisconsin in holding a
conspirator liable for a crime committed by a coconspirator,
regardless of whether he or she has actively participated as a
solicitor or an aider and abettor.43 Such liability may be im-
posed, for example, even where the defendant never actually
agreed to the specific crime charged, 44 or where the defend-
ant did not know the person who committed the crime.45 The
conspiracy theory has been supported under a number of ra-
tionales. Under one explanation, "one of the surest ways to
encourage another to commit a crime is to enter into a con-
spiracy with him for the accomplishment of that very re-
sult."46 The Wisconsin court used this group encouragement
rationale in its leading case on accomplice liability, State v.
Nutley:47 "[T]he fact of the agreement materially reinforces
the desire of the parties to carry out their portion of the divi-
sion of criminal labor. Since each conspirator psychologi-
cally reinforces the conduct of the overt perpetrator, each is
justly held responsible for his substantive crime. 48 Closely
Klein, Conspiracy -The Prosecutor's Darling, 24 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 7 (1957). An-
other commentator, on the other hand, has suggested that solicitation and conspiracy
are virtually the same, at least in cases involving few individuals: As to solicitation,
"[ilf4 said to D, 'I wish you would murder X,' whereupon D hunted up X and killed
him,A, would be guilty of murder." Perkins, supra note 22, at 358 (footnote omitted).
As to conspiracy, "[i]f A said to D, 'Let us murder X, to which D agreed, and D
promptly hunted up X and killed him, the only reasonable conclusion is that .4 is
guilty of murder." Id
42. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., supra note 3.
44. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
45. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
46. State v. Barton, -_ R.I._.., 424 A.2d 1033, 1037 (1981) (quoting Perkins, supra
note 22, at 358).
47. 24 Wis. 2d 527, 556, 129 N.W.2d 155, 167 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 918
(1965).
48. Id (footnote omitted).
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related to group encouragement is the group danger ration-
ale set forth in Callanan v. United States:49
[C]ollective criminal agreement ... presents a greater po-
tential threat to the public than individual delicts. Con-
certed action both increases the likelihood that the criminal
object will be successfully attained and decreases the
probability that the individuals involved will depart from
their path of criminality. Group association for criminal
purposes often, if not normally, makes possible the attain-
ment of ends more complex than those which one criminal
could accomplish. Nor is the danger of a conspiratorial
group limited to the particular end toward which it has em-
barked. Combination in crime makes more likely the com-
mission of crimes unrelated to the original purpose for
which the group was formed. In sum, the danger which a
conspiracy generates is not confined to the substantive of-
fense which is the immediate aim of the enterprise.50
Finally, the Pinkerton Court's rationale included reasoning
by analogy from the principle in the law of conspiracy that
the act of one is the act of all: if one conspirator may supply
the overt act necessary to commit all of the partners of the
independent crime of conspiracy, "the same act or acts are
...likewise attributable to the others for the purpose of
holding them responsible for the substantive offense. 51
The group encouragement and group danger rationales
have not been directly attacked by courts critical of the con-
spiracy theory. However, the New York Court of Appeals in
49. 364 U.S. 587 (1961). The Callanan group danger reasoning was cited as a
basis for the conspiracy theory in State v. Barton, __ R.I.____, 424 A.2d 1033, 1037
(1981).
50. 364 U.S. at 593-94, quoted with approval in Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S.
770,778 (1975). The group danger rationale also provides the basis for the independ-
ent crime of conspiracy and the basis for the federal rule imposing separate convic-
tions and consecutive sentences for the conspiracy and for a crime which is the
objective of the conspiracy. Id at 777-78. However, consecutive sentences are rarely
imposed in practice. Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal A4greement in Theory and
Practice, 65 GA. L. REv. 925, 938 (1977) (findings based on survey of criminal trial
judges and attorneys). In Wisconsin such consecutive sentences are not allowed
under Wis. STAT. § 939.72(1) (1979). See supra note 7.
51. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946). Pinkerton "is the case
most often cited when speaking of vicarious liability in a conspiracy context ...."
State v. Barton, - R.I., _, 424 A.2d 1033, 1036 (1981). See the discussion of the
Pinkerton case supra in text accompanying notes 14-21.
[Vol. 66:344
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People v. McGee52 criticized the Pinkerton analogy from the
principle operating in the independent crime of conspir-
acy-that the act of one is the act of all. 3 The New York
court admitted that once a criminal agreement is shown, the
overt act of any conspirator may be attributed to other con-
spirators to establish the independent crime of conspiracy,54
and that act may be the specific substantive crime.55 How-
ever, the court pointed out that the overt act is not the crime
in a conspiracy prosecution,5 6 but is merely an element of
the crime that has its basis in the criminal agreement. A
conviction of conspiracy may stand on the overt act commit-
ted by another because the act "merely provides corrobora-
tion of the existence of the agreement and indicates that the
agreement has reached a point where it poses a sufficient
threat to society to impose sanctions."58 Thus, the principle
that the act of one is the act of all may be applied to prove
the existence of the socially harmful agreement to which the
defendant is a party,59 but the New York court would not
extend that principle to punish the defendant for substantive
crimes in which he or she did not participate.60 Such an ex-
tension "is repugnant to our system of jurisprudence, where
guilt is generally personal to the defendant.'
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has long
been opposed to the conspiracy theory,62 and was the first
court to raise this issue of personal guilt.63 The conspiracy
theory runs contrary to the principle in our criminal law that
52. 49 N.Y.2d 48, 399 N.E.2d 1177, 424 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1979), cert. denied sub
nom. Quamina v. New York, 446 U.S. 942 (1980).
53. Id at 57-58, 399 N.E.2d at 1181-82, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 162. The principle that
the act of one conspirator is the act of all has also been applied as a rule of evidence.
See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
54. Id at 57, 399 N.E.2d at 1181-82, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 162.
55. Id at 57, 399 N.E.2d at 1182, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 162.
56. Id at 57-58, 399 N.E.2d at 1182, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 162.
57. Id
58. Id at 58, 399 N.E.2d at 1182, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 162.
59. Id
60. Id
61. Id
62. Commonwealth v. Knapp, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 494 (1830).
63. Commonwealth v. Stasiun, 349 Mass. 38, 48, 206 N.E.2d 672, 679 (1965). See
also Commonwealth v. Richards, 363 Mass. 299, 306, 293 N.E.2d 854, 859 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Perry, 357 Mass. 149, 152, 256 N.E.2d 745, 757 (1970).
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one is punished for one's own blameworthy conduct, not
that of others.64 Recently, the North Carolina Supreme
Court, in State v. Small,65 joined Massachusetts and New
York in rejecting the conspiracy theory and cited as its ra-
tionale a violation of the principle of personal guilt. 66
In raising the issue of personal guilt with respect to the
conspiracy theory, the Massachusetts and New York courts
have cited Professor Sayre's article on criminal responsibility
for the acts of another,67 in which he notes that the concept
of personal guilt was well established in criminal law by the
eighteenth century; that concept is best described as a repu-
diation of the doctrine of respondeat superior developing in
that century in the law of torts.68 Under the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior the master is liable for the acts of his or
her servant committed within the scope of employment and
in the course of the business.69 Since the case of Rex v. Hug-
gins70 it has been clear that respondeat superior may not
serve as a basis for criminal liability.7' InRex v. Huggins the
court stated that "[it is a point not to be disputed but that in
criminal cases the principal is not answerable for the act of
the deputy, as he is in civil cases; they must each answer for
their own acts, and stand or fall by their own behavior. '72
The doctrine of respondeat superior has no place in criminal
law because "it is of the very essence of our deep-rooted no-
tions of criminal liability that guilt be personal and individ-
ual; and in the last analysis the inarticulate, subconscious
sense of justice of the man on the street is the only sure foun-
dation of law. ' 73 In civil law, a claim may be made against
64. Stasiun, 349 Mass. at 48, 206 N.E.2d at 679.
65. 301 N.C. 407, 272 S.E.2d 128 (1980).
66. Id at _, 272 S.E.2d at 137.
67. Sayre, CriminalfResponsibility For the Acts ofAnother, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689,
702-06 (1930), citedin People v. McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 48, 58, 399 N.E.2d 1177, 1182,424
N.Y.S.2d 157, 162 (1979), cert. denied sub nom. Quamina v. New York, 446 U.S. 942
(1980); Commonwealth v. Stasiun, 349 Mass. 38, 48, 206 N.E.2d 672, 679 (1965).
68. Sayre, supra note 67, at 699-701.
69. Id at 702. See, e.g., Saunders v. DEC Int'l, Inc., 85 Wis. 2d 70, 270 N.W.2d
176 (1978); Snider v. Northern States Power Co., 81 Wis. 2d 224, 260 N.W.2d 260
(1977).
70. 2 Strange 882 (1730), quoted in Sayre, supra note 67, at 700-01.
71. Sayre, supra note 67, at 701.
72. 2 Strange at 885, quoted in Sayre, supra note 67, at 700-01.
73. Sayre, supra note 67, at 717 (footnote omitted).
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all conspirators for damages resulting from acts committed
pursuant to the conspiracy by one or more conspirators. 4
The basis for civil liability of a conspirator resembles the lia-
bility of a master for torts of a servant under the doctrine of
respondeat superior." If the respondeat superior reasoning of
civil conspiracy has no place in criminal law, the criminal
responsibility of a conspirator should not be as broad as the
civil liability of a conspirator. However, courts, citing Pro-
fessor Sayre,76 that reject the vicarious criminal liability of
the conspiracy theory impliedly suggest that such a theory
approaches the doctrine of respondeat superior.
To suggest that the conspiracy theory is comparable to
respondeat superior may be extreme. Respondeat superior
has no place in criminal law because it would impose penal-
ties on defendants who have met the social standards of the
criminal law.
The distinction between respondeat superior in tort law
and its application to the criminal law is obvious. In tort
law, the doctrine is employed for the purpose of settling the
incidence of loss upon the party who can best bear such
loss. But the criminal law is supported by totally different
concepts. We impose penal treatment upon those who in-
jure or menace social interests, partly in order to reform,
partly to prevent the continuation of the anti-social activity
and partly to deter others. If a defendant has personally
lived up to the social standards of the criminal law and has
not menaced or injured anyone, why impose penal
treatments? 77
Criminal conspirators, however, cannot claim that they have
lived up to the standards of criminal law; they thus may de-
serve harsh penal treatment under the group encouragement
and group danger reasoning noted above.78
74. See, e.g., Augustine v. Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 75 Wis. 2d
207, 249 N.W.2d 547 (1977); JoHn v. Oster, 44 Wis. 2d 623, 172 N.W.2d 12 (1969);
Cohn v. Zippel, 12 Wis. 2d 258, 107 N.W.2d 184 (1961).
75. State v. Small, 301 N.C. 407, - n.12.1, 272 S.E.2d 128, 138 n.12.1 (1980).
76. See supra note 67.
77. Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, - n.l, 155 A.2d 825, 827 n.1
(1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 848 (1960), quoted in W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra
note 24, § 32 at 224, where it was argued that criminal liability should be imposed on
faultless employers for conduct of employees only where minor penalties, excluding
imprisonment, are involved.
78. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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While it may be extreme to claim that the conspiracy the-
ory approaches respondeat superior, cases applying the con-
spiracy theory may in fact offend the elementary notion that
guilt must be personal to the defendant.79 In Anderson v. Su-
perior Court,80 the defendant referred at least two women to
an abortionist for a portion of the abortionist's fee. Proof
that the defendant was part of the general conspiracy was
held sufficient for trial and possible conviction of the defend-
ant for twenty-six subsequent abortions in which she did not
participate.8' In United States v. Scrugg8 2 the court upheld
the defendant's convictions for seven counts of transporting
altered money orders, 3 rejecting the defendant's claim that
there was no evidence to support the convictions. The
Scruggs court held the defendant liable for the acts of co-
conspirators who altered and passed the money orders, and
stated that vicarious liability attached even if the defendant
neither participated in the acts nor knew of them.84 Further,
the conspiracy theory, if adhered to, could hold each retailer
in a huge narcotics ring liable for every sale of narcotics
79. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. The principle of personal guilt has
not always prevailed in criminal law. Examples of early criminal liability resting on a
nonpersonal basis include liability of the clan for the wrongs of its members, or the
male head of the household for the wrongs of the members of his household. Sayre,
supra note 67, at 717 n.102 (citing I F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF THE
ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1898). The concept of personal guilt prevails as law matures:
[A]s law matures, personal and individual criminal responsibility comes to
supplant group responsibility. The latter may be an effective way of enforcing
law and order, but it does violence to our more sophisticated present-day con-
ceptions of justice. There seems no question but that a state law imposing a
fine upon all the residents of a city ward in which a murder occurred would be
held unconstitutional today, because it would offend our modem sense of pro-
priety and justice.
Id
Judges have suggested that application of conspiracy theory might be held uncon-
stitutional as a violation of due process if the defendant is convicted of a substantive
crime with no participation in the crime. United States v. Moreno, 588 F.2d 490, 493
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 936 (1979); Park v. Huff, 506 F.2d 849, 864-65
(5th Cir. 1975) (Thomberry, J., dissenting).
80. 78 Cal. App. 2d 22, 177 P.2d 315 (Ct. App. 1947).
81. Id at , 177 P.2d at 316-17.
82. 583 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978).
83. The money order scheme consisted of purchasing money orders in small
amounts, altering the amounts to large sums and then cashing the altered money or-
ders. Id at 239.
84. Id at 242.
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made by every other retailer."
The drafters of the Model Penal Code rejected the con-
spiracy theory, concluding that it is unjust to hold a conspir-
ator accountable for crimes he or she did not influence. 6
Admitting that all conspirators ought to be punished for
their criminal agreement,87 the drafters argued that only
those conspirators who actively participate in the specific
crimes ought to be punished for such crimes.88 Discussing
the well known case involving Lucky Luciano89 and his lieu-
tenants in a New York City vice ring, the drafters noted:
Luciano and others were convicted of sixty-two counts of
compulsory prostitution, each count involving a specific in-
stance of placing a girl in a house of prostitution, receiving
money for so doing or receiving money from the earnings
of a prostitute, acts proved to have been done pursuant to
combination to control commercialized vice in New York
City. The liability was properly imposed with respect to
those defendants, who directed and controlled the combi-
nation; they commanded, encouraged and aided the com-
mission of numberless specific crimes.90
The drafters then contrasted the leaders of the conspiracy,
who could have been convicted under traditional accomplice
theories of aiding and abetting or of solicitation without any
help from conspiracy theory, with others less involved who
could not have been guilty of the many specific crimes under
the traditional accomplice theories. As to the lesser mem-
bers of the conspiracy--each of the prostitutes or runners in-
85. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 24, § 65 at 514 (citing United States v.
Bruno, 105 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1939), rev'don other grounds, 308 U.S. 287 (1939), a case
involving 88 defendants in a narcotics conspiracy). See also United States v. Decker,
543 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1976). InDecker the court held that the conspiracy theory of
accomplice liability applies to narcotics conspiracies, stating:
The "chain" conspiracy has as its ultimate purpose the placing of the forbid-
den commodity into the hands of the ultimate purchaser. . . . That form of
conspiracy is dictated by a division of labor at the various functional levels-
exportation of the drug from Europe and importation into the United States,
adulteration and packaging, distribution to reliable sellers, and ultimately the
sale to the narcotics user.
Id at 1104 (quoting United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 826 (2d Cir. 1962)).
86. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 comment (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953).
87. Id
88. Id
89. People v. Luciano, 277 N.Y. 348, 14 N.E.2d 433 (1938).
90. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3) comment (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953).
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volved in the plan-the extensive liability for all sixty-two
crimes would have been possible only under conspiracy the-
ory, since, apart from entering the overall criminal agree-
ment, the lesser members exerted little influence. Such
liability would be unjust because although they committed
specific crimes and may have assisted others,
they exerted no substantial influence on the behavior of a
hundred other girls or runners, each pursuing his or her
own ends within the shelter of the combination. A court
would, and should hold that they are all parties to a single,
large conspiracy; this is itself, and ought to be, a crime. But
it is one crime. Law would lose all sense of proportion if in
virtue of that one crime, each were held accountable for
thousands of offenses that he did not influence at all. 9 1
This argument is most persuasive in cases similar to
those just noted involving complicated criminal schemes.
Holding defendants liable for crimes committed by cocon-
spirators appears most troublesome in cases involving com-
plex conspiracies with members operating at many different
levels.92 The modem criminal organization "is frequently
structured like an ordinary business with different echelons
of authority and responsibility. ' 93 Traditional accomplice
theories of aiding and abetting and of solicitation are suffi-
cient to convict those at the upper echelons for specific
crimes arising out of the conspiracy, as the drafters of the
Model Penal Code noted.94 However, conspiracy theory is
necessary to punish those at lower levels for specific crimes
in which they did not participate.
Whether such defendants at lower levels deserve the
harsh treatment of the conspiracy theory ultimately becomes
a choice among values. The group encouragement and
group danger arguments noted above 95 must be set against
concerns expressed by three state courts that the conspiracy
91. Id
92. See Perkins, supra note 22, at 352-58.
93. Id at 354 n.117. See also sufpra note 85.
94. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text. Traditional accomplice theo-
ries may be sufficient to convict but insufficient to penalize such leaders of criminal
organizations. Congress sought to eradicate organized crime by adding severe pen-
alty provisions for those who initiate, organize and supervise criminal organizations.
18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)(3) (1976). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1964 (1976). The Wiscon-
sin Organized Crime Control Act is a similar effort to control organized crime. Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 946.80-.87 (West Supp. 1982-1983).
95. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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theory offends traditional notions of personal guilt.96 Those
who focus on the principle of personal guilt may reject the
idea of liability for crimes committed by coconspirators by
arguing that the problems of group encouragement and
group danger may be dealt with by imposing a penalty for
the independent crime of conspiracy. On the other hand,
those less concerned with the principle of personal guilt may
argue that a conspiracy conviction fails to deal with group
encouragement and group danger; convictions for substan-
tive crimes committed by coconspirators may be justified as
an "occupational hazard"98 confronting those tempted to en-
gage in a criminal conspiracy. 99
The choice of whether to accept the conspiracy theory
under the reasoning of group encouragement and group
danger, or to reject the theory in favor of the principle of
personal guilt, involves a difficult balancing of interests in
complicated conspiracy cases.'0 It has been argued, how-
ever, that the need to attack such complicated criminal
schemes with the conspiracy theory may be overestimated.' 0'
Arguably, analysis focusing on group encouragement and
group danger
seems to mistake the nature of the typical conspiratorial
group, and therefore to overestimate the need for this at-
tack on organized crime. It is an oversimplification to re-
gard most group crimes as resulting from the machinations
of large criminal organizations; in many cases, the perpe-
trator receives his aid or counsel from at most a few indi-
viduals. The application of traditional complicity rules
96. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text. A number of commentators
also have been critical of the conspiracy theory: See, e.g., ABA Criminal Justice Sec-
tion, American Bar Association Policy Regarding S-1, The Proposed Federal Crimi-
nal Code (94th Congress) at 5 (1975); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 24, § 65 at
513-15; MODEL PENAL CODE comment § 2.04 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953); National
Committee on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Working Papers 156 (1970); Klein,
supra note 41, at 7-9; Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L.
REV. 920, 994-1000 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
97. See supra note 7. See also People v. McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 48, 57-58, 399 N.E.2d
1177, 1181-82, 424 N.Y.S.2d 157, 162 (1979), cert. denied sub nom. Quamina v. New
York, 446 U.S. 942 (1980).
98. State v. Barton, - R.I.., , 424 A.2d 1033, 1038 (1981).
99. Id
100. See Note, The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime or Protec-
tion of Individual Defendants, 62 HARV. L. REv. 276, 283-84 (1948).
101. Developments, supra note 96, at 999.
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alone will ordinarily be sufficient to hold each member of a
small-scale conspiracy liable for acts committed in its
furtherance. 10
2
Wisconsin cases employing the conspiracy theory have
involved such small scale operations. Conspirators held lia-
ble for agreed upon crimes'0 3 and for crimes arising as a nat-
ural and probable consequence out of the agreed upon
crimes, °4 were actively involved in the specific crimes. The
defendants in these cases could have been convicted under
the traditional accomplice theories of aiding and abetting
and solicitation. 0 5 Further, the courts of the three states re-
jecting the conspiracy theory have noted that past cases em-
ploying language suggestive of conspiracy theory involved
102. Id
103. Bergeron v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 595, 271 N.W.2d 386 (1978) (evidence that
defendant helped find someone to kill the victim); Miller v. State, 25 Wis. 384 (1870)
(evidence that defendant either inflicted mortal blow with her own hand or was pres-
ent aiding and abetting her husband in murder), cited in W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT,
supra note 24, § 65 at 513 n.5; Wray v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 367, 275 N.W.2d 731 (Ct.
App. 1978) (defendant arrested while fleeing from the burglary scene), affid per
curiam, 91 Wis. 2d 839, 280 N.W.2d 784 (1979).
104. State v. Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d 527, 129 N.W.2d 155 (1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 918 (1965) (defendant active in gun fight held liable for partner's attempted mur-
der based on conspiracy to resist arrest); State v. Bachmeyer, 247 Wis. 294, 19 N.W.2d
261 (1945) (driver of getaway car held liable for partner's murder based on conspiracy
to commit armed robbery); Pollack v. State, 215 Wis. 200, 253 N.W. 560 (1934) (de-
fendant present and actively involved in robbery held liable for partner's first degree
murder based on conspiracy to rob), overruled on other grounds, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133
N.W.2d 753 (1965), cited in W. LAFAVE & A. Scor, supra note 24, § 65 at 513 n.3.
Under the natural and probable consequence rule of § 939.05(2)(c) a conspirator
or a solicitor need not intend the specific crime charged. Section 939.05 does not
explicitly provide that an aider and abettor, as well, may be liable for a crime other
than the intended crime. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that an
aider and abettor is responsible not only for an intended crime, but also for other
crimes which were committed as a natural and probable consequence of the intended
crime. State v. Manson, 76 Wis. 2d 482, 486, 251 N.W.2d 788, 790 (1977); State v.
Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d 411, 430-31, 249 N.W.2d 529, 537-38 (1977); State v. Cydzik, 60
Wis. 2d 683, 696-99, 211 N.W.2d 421, 429-31 (1973); State v. Stanton, 106 Wis. 2d
172, 176-80, 316 N.W.2d 134, 137-38 (Ct. App. 1982).
Although the natural and probable consequence rule holds parties to a crime
equally guilty regardless of intent, the intent and culpability of an individual defend-
ant may be considered in sentencing. State v. McClanahan, 54 Wis. 2d 751, 757, 196
N.W.2d 700, 703 (1972). See also Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982) (United
States Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment forbids imposition of the death
penalty on a defendant who aids and abets a robbery in the course of which a murder
is committed but is unintended and committed by others).
105. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
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defendants who had not merely conspired in but had ac-
tively participated in the crimes. 10 6 One might conclude,
then, that traditional accomplice theories are sufficient, and
that the conspiracy theory is unnecessary to hold a defend-
ant liable for crimes committed by another.
Although Wisconsin conspiracy cases reveal defendants
actively involved in uncomplicated group crimes, one cannot
be certain that this pattern will continue. Future state cases
may involve complex criminal schemes whereby conspira-
tors at the periphery of the criminal enterprises might be
convicted of crimes they did not influence, as discussed
above. 07 The federal system usually handles the complex
conspiracies. 0 8 With its greater resources the federal system
is best suited to combat schemes involving white collar
crime, and organized crime, including narcotics smuggling
and extortion. 10 9 However, survey research findings suggest
that with the growing sophistication of crime, state prosecu-
tors will begin to turn to conspiracy theory as an effective
approach to serious criminal activities such as narcotics, rob-
bery, consumer fraud and other white collar crimes." 0
The group encouragement and group danger arguments
may become significant if state prosecutors in future cases
look to conspiracy theory as a means to effectively deal with
complicated criminal schemes. Currently, the need for con-
spiracy theory appears questionable because traditional ac-
complice theories are sufficient to deal with the small scale
group crime which predominates in state prosecutions."'
Even if one accepts the group encouragement and group
danger arguments in favor of conspiracy theory as currently
valid in Wisconsin, a final factor involving the law of evi-
dence must be considered before one can conclude that the
106. State v. Small, 301 N.C. 407, _, 272 S.E.2d 128, 141 (1980); People v. Mc-
Gee, 49 N.Y.2d 48, 58, 399 N.E.2d 1177, 1182, 424 N.Y.S.2d 157, 162 (1979); Com-
monwealth v. Stasiun, 349 Mass. 38, 49, 306 N.E.2d 672, 679 (1965).
107. See supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
108. See Marcus, supra note 50, at 946-50 (findings based on survey of criminal
trial judges and attorneys).
109. Id
110. Id
111. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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conspiracy theory merits its place in the party to a crime
statute.' 12
The so-called coconspirator rule of evidence is a power-
ful tool available to prosecutors 1 3 which places a difficult
burden on defendants in group crime cases. The rule is an-
other application of the general principle that the act of one
conspirator is the act of all: If A and B are engaged in a
conspiracy, the acts and statements of B occurring while the
conspiracy is actually in progress and in furtherance of the
design are provable against A because they are acts for
which A is responsible as a matter of substantive law.' 4 It
may be obvious that the acts of B are provable against A
It is not so clear that B's statements ought to be provable
against A, in light of principles under the confrontation
clause 1 6  and under hearsay principles 17  which argue
against admitting out of court statements not subject to
cross-examination when made. 18 Such statements, however,
112. See Klein, supra note 41, at 9; Developments, supra note 96, at 999-1000.
113. Developments, supra note 96, at 984-89 (1959).
114. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 267, at 645 (2d
ed. 1972) (footnote omitted).
115. The principal limitation on the admission of acts is relevancy. Develop-
ments, supra note 96, at 988. "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
Wis. STAT. § 904.01 (1979).
116. The defendant has the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against
him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
117. The general rule is that out of court statements presented at trial to prove the
truth of the matter asserted are inadmissible. Wis. STAT. §§ 908.01(l)-(3), 908.02
(1979). But see Wis. STAT. § 908.01(4)(b)5.
118. One author has summarized the concerns underlying both the hearsay rule
and the confrontation clause:
Underlying the general hearsay rule that out-of-court statements presented
at trial to prove the truth of matters asserted therein are inadmissible is a basic
concern for reliability. Such statements lack three safeguards that surround
the introduction of non-hearsay evidence: hearsay statements are not made
under oath; they are not made under circumstances such that the trier of fact
can consider the demeanor of the declarants; and, most important, they are not
subject to cross-examination. Thus, it is felt that the party against whom they
are introduced cannot adequately test whether the declarant was sincerely tell-
ing what he believed to be the truth, whether the declarant accurately per-
ceived and remembered the matter he related, and whether the declarant's
intended meaning is adequately conveyed by the language he employed. In
the absence of some special guarantee of reliability inherent in the circum-
stances surrounding the making of such statements, their admission in criminal
cases presents a significant danger of misguided convictions.
This concern for reliability, especially in its focus on the importance of
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are not hearsay under Wisconsin law,1 19 and are generally
admissible provided a foundation is laid by independent
proof of the conspiracy. Objections under the confronta-
tion clause to admission of statements of a coconspirator-
declarant usually are ruled in favor of admission when the
prosecution has either produced, or demonstrated the un-
availability of, the declarant;1 2 1 when the declarant is un-
available the prosecution must demonstrate that the
declarant's statements bear adequate indicia of trustworthi-
ness.122  Surviving a confrontation clause challenge, state-
ments of a coconspirator made during the course of and in
furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible against all par-
ties to the conspiracy. 123
For example, in the recent case of State v. Dorcey,124 the
defendant was charged with delivery of a controlled sub-
stance as a party to the crime. The state provided independ-
cross-examination, seems also to be the hallmark of the sixth amendment's
confrontation clause, which ensures to each defendant the right "to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him."
Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-conspirator Exception in Criminal
Prosecutions,- A Functional.Analysir, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1378, 1378-79 (1972) (foot-
notes omitted).
119. Section 908.01(4)(b)5 provides: "A statement is not hearsay if. . . Itihe
statement is offered against a party and is. . . [a] statement by a coconspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." See, e.g., State v.
Dorcey, 103 Wis. 2d 152, 157, 306 N.W.2d 612, 614-15 (1981); Bergeron v. State, 85
Wis. 2d 595, 612-13, 271 N.W.2d 386, 394-95 (1978).
120. Dorcey, 103 Wis. 2d at 157, 307 N.W.2d at 614. Not all of the elements of
the crime of conspiracy need be proven, and the defendant need not be charged with
conspiracy. Id (citing Caccitolo v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 102, 230 N.W.2d 139 (1975);
O'Neil v. State, 237 Wis. 391, 296 N.W. 96 (1941); 22A C.J.S., Criminal Law § 758b
(1961)). The statement of one coconspirator will not be received against another until
a prima facie case of a conspiracy has first been made. Dorcey, 103 Wis. 2d at 157,
307 N.W.2d at 615 (citing State v. Timm, 244 Wis. 508, 12 N.W.2d 670 (1944); Gelosi
v. State, 215 Wis. 649, 255 N.W. 893 (1934); 22A C.J.S., CriminalLaw § 760b (1961)).
The conspiracy upon which admissibility depends must be proven independently of
the coconspirator's statements at issue. Dorcey, 103 Wis. 2d at 158, 306 N.W.2d at
614 (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942)); Federal Life Ins. Co. v.
Thayer, 222 Wis. 658, 269 N.W. 547 (1936). However, the court may hear the dis-
puted testimony first, contingent upon a later showing that there was a conspiracy.
Dorcey, 103 Wis. 2d at 158, 307 N.W.2d at 614 (citing United States v. Halpin, 374
F.2d 493 (7th Cir. 1967)); Schultz v. State, 133 Wis. 215, 113 N.W. 428 (1907).
121. Dorcey, 103 Wis. 2d at 161, 307 N.W.2d at 616-17 (citations omitted).
122. Id (citations omitted).
123. Id at 162-63, 307 N.W.2d at 617 (citing Wis. STAT. § 908.01(4)(b)5 (1979)).
124. 103 Wis. 2d 152, 307 N.W.2d 612 (1981).
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ent proof of a conspiracy for purposes of the rules of
evidence, including evidence that the defendant delivered
cocaine to his coconspirator.12 5 Finding the independent ev-
idence of a conspiracy sufficient, the trial court admitted the
testimony of an undercover officer who had gone to the
coconspirator's house to purchase the cocaine.126 The officer
testified that the coconspirator offered to sell him cocaine
and also testified as to a phone conversation he overheard
which was damaging to the defendant. 27 The supreme court
held that the officer's testimony was admissible although the
defendant was not present in the house when the cocon-
spirator's statements were made. 28
Admitting statements of coconspirators may be justified
when the statements have a high degree of assurance of
trustworthiness. 129 Justice Abrahamson has been persuaded,
however, by commentators arguing that coconspirators'
statements may be highly untrustworthy.130 One commenta-
tor has argued that coconspirators' declarations are reliable
to prove that some conspiracy exists, but are less trustworthy
to show its aims and membership.' 3' Perhaps the cocon-
spirator rule of evidence is supportable, if at all, not on a
theory of trustworthiness but on a theory of necessity:
It has been said that admission of coconspirators' hearsay
declarations is justified by necessity. The suggestion is that
criminal agreements are inherently secret, that participa-
tion is possible without the commission of overt acts, and
consequently that there is a necessity sufficient to justify
125. Id at 155, 307 N.W.2d at 613.
126. Id at 155, 307 N.W.2d at 614.
127. Id at 154, 307 N.W.2d at 613.
128. Id at 159-60, 307 N.W.2d at 615-16.
129. In Dorcey the coconspirator-declarant's statements were considered suffi-
ciently trustworthy to survive a confrontation clause challenge because the statements
were against the declarant's penal interests. Id at 164, 307 N.W.2d at 618.
130. id at 174-79, 302 N.W.2d at 619-24 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (quoting
with approval Davenport, supra note 118, at 1384; Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy-4
Reexamination of the Co-Conspirators' Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 52 MIcH. L.
Rav. 1159, 1165-66 (1954); Comment, The Hearsay Exception for Co-Conspirators'
Declarations, 25 U. CHi. L. REy. 530, 533-34, 539-41 (1958); Note, Preserving the
Right to Confrontation-A New 4pproach to Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113
U. PA. L. REy. 741 (1965)).
131. Levie, supra note 130, at 1165-66, quotedin State v. Dorcey, 103 Wis. 2d 152,
177, 307 N.W.2d 612, 624 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
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admission of hearsay of questionable reliability .... 132
Prosecutors and defense counsel, of course, come to different
conclusions on the merits of the coconspirator rule of evi-
dence. 33  At a minimum, one can conclude that the rule
plays a major role in group crime cases; 134 it may allow the
jury to hear evidence otherwise considered unreliable with
the danger that the verdict on the alleged crimes will be un-
duly affected.' 35
This danger becomes particularly important in combina-
tion with the conspiracy theory of accomplice liability,
where proof of involvement in a conspiracy is all that is re-
quired for guilt as to alleged crimes. 3 6 In State v. Small,137
the North Carolina Supreme Court refused to make such a
combination. In Small the court rejected the conspiracy
theory, but admitted that involvement in a conspiracy,
proved in part through the coconspirator rule of evidence,
may be strong evidence of active participation. 138 When one
who conspires is shown to have been present at the scene,
evidence of the conspiracy, including acts and statements of
all the conspirators may be relevant to show the defendant
aided and abetted in the commission of the crime. 139 Like-
wise, when the defendant-conspirator is shown to have been
absent from the scene, evidence of the conspiracy may be
relevant to prove the state's solicitation theory. 140 In North
Carolina party to a crime cases, then, the coconspirator rule
of evidence is important to help the jury accept or reject the
state's argument that the defendant actively participated.14 '
132. Comment, supra note 130, at 534, quotedin State v. Dorcey, 103 Wis. 2d 152,
176, 307 N.W.2d 612, 624 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
133. "Not surprisingly, prosecutors, and perhaps even courts at times, tend to
welcome this opportunity for a more relaxed admission of evidence, while defense
counsel regard the [coconspirator] exception as a plague upon both their clients and
the integrity of the criminal process." Davenport, supra note 118, at 1385 (footnotes
omitted).
134. Id at 1383.
135. Id
136. Klein, supra note 41, at 9; Developments, supra note 96, at 999-1000.
137. 301 N.C. 407, - 272 S.E.2d 128, 135-37 (1980).
138. Id at 272 S.E.2d at 136.
139. Id
140. Id
141. Id (citing MODEL PENAL CODE comment § 2.04(3) (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1953)).
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However, evidence of involvement in the conspiracy will not
itself make the defendant liable for crimes committed by co-
conspirators.142 Under Wisconsin's conspiracy theory, proof
that one has conspired is sufficient to hold one liable for sub-
stantive crimes. 14 3 Arguably, combining the conspiracy the-
ory with the coconspirator rule of evidence places a burden
on the defendant which outweighs the possible benefits to
society.144
The group danger argument in favor of the conspiracy
theory focuses on society's interest in eradicating group
crime. 45  If that interest is serious enough to justify the
"harsh rule"'' 46 that membership in a conspiracy is sufficient
for conviction of coconspirators' crimes, one might expect
that "courts should insist upon competent, definitive and
highly reliable evidence to establish that the accused had in
fact entered into a corrupt agreement."' 47 However, a leni-
ent attitude towards the prosecution is apparent in the
coconspirator rule of evidence.148 This rule allowing admis-
sion of possibly unreliable out of court statements thus ap-
pears as another "harsh rule" which may burden an
individual defendant while it promotes society's interest in
eradicating group crime. The coconspirator rule of evidence
often aids the prosecution by showing a defendant's active
involvement in a crime, as discussed in Small;49 however,
evidence of coconspirators' statements may show nothing
more than membership in a conspiracy. The fact that liabil-
ity for coconspirators' crimes may be imposed based upon
possibly unreliable evidence of membership in a conspiracy
142. Id at 137 (citing People v. McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 48, 399 N.E.2d 1177, 424
N.Y.S.2d 157 (1979), cert. denied sub nom. Quamina v. New York, 446 U.S. 942
(1980)).
Out of court declarations or acts of conspirators present one of a number of ways
to prove involvement in a conspiracy. Also important may be evidence of acts and
declarations of the defendant himself, testimony of a coconspirator who has turned
state's evidence and circumstantial evidence. Developments, supra note 96, at 984-85.
143. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
144. Klein, supra note 41, at 9; Developments, supra note 96, at 999-1000.
145. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
146. State v. Barton, - R.I., _, 424 A.2d 1033, 1038 (1981).
147. Klein, supra note 41, at 9.
148. Id
149. See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
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is an argument against the conspiracy theory.' 50 Since the
liberal coconspirator rule of evidence is available to prosecu-
tors to combat group crime, it becomes less persuasive to ar-
gue under the group danger rationale that society needs the
further protection of the conspiracy theory of accomplice
liability.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Wisconsin conspiracy theory of accomplice liability
holds one who conspires to commit a crime responsible for
all crimes committed by coconspirators in furtherance of the
conspiracy. It has been argued that a coconspirator deserves
such punishment because agreeing to commit a crime en-
courages the criminal conduct of coconspirators. The con-
spiracy theory has been further justified on the ground that
collective criminal agreement presents a greater danger to
society than individual criminal activity. These principles of
group encouragement and group danger may explain why
the conspiracy theory has been approved by most
jurisdictions.
The conspiracy theory is subject to question because the
need for the theory to deal with group encouragement and
group danger may be overestimated. Wisconsin cases have
involved small scale conspiracies with members actively par-
ticipating in the specific crimes. Any conspirator actively in-
volved in a crime directly executed by another may be
convicted of such a crime under traditional accomplice theo-
ries of aiding and abetting and of solicitation. Further,
where a large scale conspiracy arises, these traditional theo-
ries are also sufficient to convict any "leader" of such a
scheme for crimes arising out of the conspiracy. By organiz-
ing or supervising the general conspiracy, such a leader ac-
tively participates in the specific crimes and is liable for the
crimes under traditional theories. Thus, in many cases the
conspiracy theory appears unnecessary.
In some cases involving complex criminal schemes, the
conspiracy theory may be necessary as a prosecutorial device
but may be criticized for failing to consider the interests of
150. Klein, supra note 41, at 9-10; Developments, supra note 96, at 999-1000.
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individual defendants. Conspirators at low levels of a crimi-
nal organization may not have participated in the specific
crimes arising out of the conspiracy. The conspiracy theory
nevertheless holds them responsible for the substantive
crimes. Holding defendants liable for crimes .they have not
influenced conflicts with the principle in criminal law that
guilt is generally personal, not vicarious. Further, such lia-
bility may be imposed with the aid of an evidentiary rule
which allows admission of possibly unreliable out of court
statements of coconspirators.
Recognizing that the conspiracy theory is unnecessary in
some cases, and offensive to elementary notions of personal
guilt in other cases, the legislature might repeal the conspir-
acy provision in the Wisconsin party to a crime statute. Re-
peal is unlikely, however, as long as the conspiracy provision
is viewed as an effective measure to combat group crime.
THOMAS A. SCHUESSLER
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